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The documentation of South Africa's relations with Latin America has previously 
received only cursory mention in work on contemporary South African history. This 
paper seeks to examine the significance of these relations and to raise a number of 
pertinent questions about the role of the state in its efforts to promote suoh 
linkages. 
Althou& trade relations existed since the early nineteenth century (l), 
and South Africa had limited diplomatic representation in Argentina and Brazil since 
1938 and 1943, respectively (2), it is only in the last dozen years that relations 
with Latin America have been expanded significantly. 
The conjuncture of the mid-1960s in South Africa saw a period of sustained 
expansion of the gross domestic product which was assisted by new injections of 
foreign inves-tment following the severe repression of the nationalist movement. But 
"growth11 required the importation of large amounts of expensive and sophisticated 
capital goods, and this took place at a much faster rate than did the increase in 
exports. South African exports - two-thirds of which consisted of primary products - 
had to overcome the adverse effects of an inflationary cost structure, and it became 
imperative that new markets for manufactured products be found, especially because it 
was feared that gold production would plateau and decline in view of the constant 
official price. 
Although Africa seemed the ideal target for a South African sub-imperial 
role, numerous political constraints presented themselves, only to be compounded 
later, after the abortive attempts at "dialogue" and ltdetente'l. Manufactured goods 
were also unlikely to be competitive with those produced in western Europe and North 
America, South Africa's traditional markets for primary products. Thus it was that 
Latin America began to be considered and cultivated as a new avenue for the marketing 
of South African exports. For this it was required that the state prepare the way by 
increasing diplomatic links (especially trade representation), and by extending credit 
and credit insurance facilities to exporters. 
The first major diplomatic thrust occurred in July 1966, when the Foreign 
Minister, Hilgard l"R.lller, and the Secretary for Commerce and Industry, H. Kotzenberg, 
visited El Salvador, Brazil, U- and Paraguay. One of the immediate spin-offs of 
the visit was the extension of relations to include Paraguay and Bolivia, and the 
consul-general in Buenos Aires received accreditation to these two states. In Rio de 
Janeiro, MUller and Kotzenberg discussed trade expansion with officials of the 
Brazilian Foreign Ministry (known as ~tamaraty), and arranged for a Brazilian trade 
mission to make a fact-finding to= of South Africa in September the same year. The 
mission's report echoed the optimism about prospects for commercial expansion which 
underlay the Castelo Branco military government's thinking. (3) 
With the reversal of the "independentw direction of Brazil's foreign policy 
as pursued by previous civilian governments, Castelo Branco had set about purging 
Itamaraty of those officials who were in favour of closer relations with Afro-Asian 
states. Despite playing host to the UN Human Rights Seminar on Apartheid in Bragilia 
barely a month after MUllerls visit, and despite voting in favour of General Assembly 
Resolution 220211 (m) the following December, which asked all states to "discourage 
immediately the establishment of closer economic and financial relations with South 
Africa", Brazil's growing trade began to outweia anti-colonial considerations as a 
criterion for developing relations with South Africa. Itamaxatyrs schizophrenia was 
to last well into the next decade. (4) 
Brazilian exports to South Africa had increased by 25% in the first two 
years of military rule, exceeding its closest rivals, Argentina and Mexico, by 6.@. 
In 1967, on the recommendation of the trade mission, Brazil participated in the Rand 
Easter Show, obtaining orders for over $3m, mostly for manufactured goods such as 
lathes. The 1968 Show afforded Brazil orders totalling nearly $31 in three dqrs for 
lathes alone, and in 1970 forty Brazilian enterprises from seven states displa~red 
their products. Trade Commissioners were exchanged, and Lloyd Brasileiro initiated 
a shipping service. In order to redress the trade balance, highly favourable to 
Brazil, South Africa sought to provide incentives for Brazil to purchase capital goods 
and services in addition to the small mounts of gold and asbestos which accounted for 
most of Brazilfs imports. To this end, a $5m revolving credit fund in the Brazilian 
National Bank for Economic Development (BNDE) was established by the South African 
government. 
The Costa e Silva government,which succeeded that of Castelo Branco in 
March 1967, initially sought to play down recent overtures by Portugal aimed at 
extending the Luso-Brazilian Treaty of Friendship and Consultation which dated from 
1953. However, resistance by those interests opposed to "Lusotropicality" was short- 
lived, and in March 1968 a new set of treaties was ratified by Brazil. These gave her 
free commercial access to all the Portuguese colonies, the most significant of which 
were Angola and Mozambique. They became markets for Brazilian manufactures, sources 
of raw materials, new areas for inves-tment, and staging-posts for Brazilian entry into 
the South African market, which absorbed nearly double the amount of Brazilian exports 
that went to Portugal in 1966 and 1967. (5) 
In November 1968, the South African Minister of Economic Affairs, Mr Jan 
Ha&, announced that the South African Reserve Bank was to purchase R1.8m worth of 
bonds made available by the Inter American Development Bank (IADB). This purchase 
allowed South African contractors and exporters to tender for any development project 
financed by the IADB in its member-countries, covering all of Latin America except 
Cuba. (6) Yet, by mid-1974, not a single South African concern had taken advantage of 
these financial arrangements, according to the general manager of the parastatal Credit 
Guarantee Insurance Corporation (CGIC), who attends the annual governors' meeting of 
the IADB. (7) 
The Secretary of Commerce, a few weeks after the purchase of the IADB bonds, 
admonished a group of exporters at a seminar organized by the South African Foreign 
Trade Organisation (SAFTO) to promote Latin America as an export market: 
I think you will all agree that these efforts of the 
Government to foster the development of expanded trade 
exchanges between South Africa and the Latin American 
countries will be fruitless unless the private sector 
is prepared to avail itself of all possible trade 
opportunities in those countries created as a result 
of the Government's recent initiatives in this direction. 
If our exporters are prepared to play their part 
and, in particular, to employ more aggressive 
marketing methods in their attempts to increase 
their share of the supply of goods and services 
to Latin American countries, I am convinced that 
our export trade with the Latin American world 
will expand appreciably in years to come. (8) 
These remarks point to the fact that the state was taking the initiative in 
laying the ground for a greater geographical diversification of the South African 
export trade. The Industrial Development Corporation (DC) had pointed out that 
South African industrialists were estimated to have exported approximately 34% of 
their total net output. In the same year some 30.7h of South Africa's total exports 
went to a single country, the United Kingdom, whilst 12.9h0 went to Japan, 7.9% to the 
USA, and 6% to the Federal Republic of Germany (totalling 57.1% in all). (9) It was 
anticipated in Pretoria that Britain would ultimately accede to the EEC and that 
barriers would be thrown round certain traditional agricultural exports. Thus even 
at this stage the state perceived the need to diversify external markets; in addition, 
this would spread the risk if one or more of its traditional trading partners imposed 
economic sanctions. 
To this end, further initiatives for expanding exports were undertaken. 
South Africa participated in international trade fairs in San Salvador, Lima and 
Bogota. (10) The Minister of Finance, Dr Nico Diederichs, in 1966 announced that the 
government would make a line of credit available to Latin American states, amongst 
others; by late 1968 only Brazil and Ecuador had availed themselves of this facility 
to the total of Rl.07m. (11) The three state or state-supported organizations 
involved in export stimulation and financing, SAFTO, CGIC and D C ,  despatched a joint 
mission to several Latin American states to discuss the supply of capital goods and 
associated services, and SAFTO published a survey on Brazil and Argentina which found 
that opportunities existed for the profitable supply by South African manufacturers of 
goods not produced by these states. The survey stressed that such market opportunities 
could not be identified unless manufacturers "take the time and trouble to visit the 
two countries and see for themselves what openings exist for their products". (12) 
After months of planning, South African Airways inaugurated a weekly flight 
from Johannesburg to New York via Rio de Janeiro, on 23 March 1969. Foreign Minister 
MUller travelled on the first flight and paid a three-* unofficial visit to his 
Brazilian counterpart, JosB de Magalhzes Pinto. (13) Brazil had resisted UN requests 
not to authorize the new service, replying that, although she opposed apartheid, "we 
do not consider it good policy to apply sanctions ... we have always abstained from 
voting in the UN on the sanctions issue and we are not committed to apply themw. (14) 
In fact, Brazil sent on the return flight a high-level delegation, including the 
Minister of Commerce and Industry and the Minister of Planning (15), to discuss trade 
with South African officials and businessmen likely to make use of the new route. 
Along with the Brazilians came ministerial delegations from Argentina and Colombia, 
who, together with diplomats from Uruguay, Bolivia and Paraguay, held a dinner for 
MKller on his return to Cape Town. Addressing them, MKller said: "1 believe there is 
no need for any unnatural or hasty attempts to force the pace in our relations with 
each other. What I envisage is a joint search for common ground or areas in which 
co-operation between South Africa and her neighbours across the Atlantic will seem 
logical and mutually beneficial. (16) Such "CO-operationt1 was evidenced later that 
year in the UN Security Council, where Bolivia and Paraguay refused to condemn South 
Africa. (17) 
The new air route soon became important to Brazil, since nearly 6@/0 of the 
traffic was disembarking in Rio. (18) This prompted the Brazilian airline Varig to 
set up a reciprocal flight from July 1970; the rapid growth in traffic in both 
directions saw an increase in the frequency of flights to four a week in 1972. 
Varig's South African manager estimated that 6W/0 of passengers on both airlines were 
businessmen. (19) The introduction of a service between Cape Town and Buenos Aires 
was delayed until April 1973, by which time Argentina had vacated her seat on the 
Security Council. (20) 
Communications were also enhanced by the completion of a submarine 
telephone cable between Brazil and the C a n a r y  Islands in May 1973, which links up 
with the Lisbon-Cape Town cable. (21) Formerly South Africa had to rely on a limited 
number of links with Brazil via telecommunications satellite. 
Important diplomatic advantages accrued to South Africa following the 
attendance of Finance Minister Diederichs at the Nairobi conference of the International 
Monetary Fund in September 1973. The sharp increase in the free market price of gold 
prompted Diederichs to announce offers of aid to underdeveloped countries which would 
be funded by part of the gold revenues, (22) On his return to South Africa, he was 
accompanied by the Uruguayan Finance Minister and the chairman of the Central Bank of 
Uruguay. (23) As a result of talks in Pretoria, the graund was laid for South African 
financial assistance to U-, which materialized in December 1974, when South Africa 
deposited R13.8m in the Central Bank of Uruguay and bought a further R6.9m worth of 
treasury bonds from the bank. (24) A month later President Bordaberry signed a decree 
announcing that Urugua3r would set up an Xmbassy in South Africa, "because of closer 
ties between the two countries as a result of increased trade between them". (25) 
The second, and perhaps more significant, response came from Paraguay. In 
August 1973, Foreign Minister Mliller led a delegation to attend an inauguration of 
General Alfredo Stroessner as president of Par-. (25) By the following J a n q  it 
was announced that Stroessner would pay an official visit to South Africa in April. (27) 
Although hardly an important statesman, even in the Latin American context, Stroessnerts 
willingness to visit South Africa furnished Pretoria with a number of propaganda points, 
however dubious their content. Stroessner was, after all, a head of state, and only 
two other heads of state had visited South Africa since 1948 (~ortugal and ~alawi). 
The government envisaged public processions, streets lined with cheering crowds, and 
the pomp of formal state ceremonies. 
However, the atmosphere surrounding the visit was to prove less favourable 
than initially presupposed. The Ehglish-language press failed to react with the same 
euphoria as its Afrikaam counterpart was doing, and published accounts of the 
repressive and corrupt nature of the Stmessner regime, carefully culled from 
ideologically llrespectablelt sources such as the Daily Telemaph and the Reader's Disst 
which had both published scathing exposds of Stmessnerrs complicity in torture and 
heroin smuggling. (28) Students of the University of Cape Town planned to march 
through the city with banners proclaiming "Stroessner go homet1, "Release all 
political prisoners", and "South Africa - donlt honour fascistsn. (29) James ECruger, 
then Deputy Minister of Justice, invoked for the first time powers acqgired weeks 
before the visit under the Riotous Assemblies Amendment Act 30/1974 to prevent all 
gatherings in protest against the visitor. "If there are people who do not know their 
manners", W-ed Vorster, "then manners will have to be taught to them." (30) 
Stroessner duly arrived, with an entourage numbering over 100, including 
cabinet ministers, amy generals, security policemen, businessmen and journalists. Two 
treaties, one concerning cultural exchanges and scientific and technological 
co-operation, and the other relating to economic co-operation and investment, were 
signed by the countries! foreign ministers. (31) At a banquet in his honour, 
Stroessner declared that "Paraguay practised a foreign policy of loyal friendship with 
those nations which shared its concepts of freedom, of fundamental human rights, of 
dignity, of the value of man, and of the democratic system of governmentw. His speech 
was applauded by a large audience which included Bantustan leaders Ntsanwisi and 
Phatudi, (32) During the visit, Stroessner continuously received warm official praise 
for his courage in resisting international objecti.ons to his friendship with South 
Africa. 
!The state visit was followed up in January 1975 by a mission of top South 
African civil servants (33) to Paraguay and Uruguay, charged with the realization of 
certain of the measures of the treaties of co-operation with Paraguay. Agreements 
were signed whereby South Africa would build two sugar plants and a pulp processing 
plant, would invest in two massive hydro-electric projects which Paraguay0was building 
jointly with Brazil and Argentina, would provide a R33m line of credit for the 
purchase of South African equipment and services, and would finance the construction 
of new Ministries of Justice and Foreign Affairs. (34) In Uruguay discussions 
centred on tourism and beef exports. 
In August 1975, to coincide with the celebration of Paraguay's national 
day, Vorster repaid Stroessner's visit of the previous year, receiving a rapturnus 
welcome in Asuncion. Further loans totalling ~ 6 m  were arranged, to assist road- 
building, housing, agriculture and the liquidity of a Paraguayan bank. The visit 
was also used to co-ordinate South Africa's entire Latin American strategy; the heads 
of all her diplomatic missions in Latin America and the UN were summoned to Asuncion 
for deliberations. The success attained in relations with P a r a m  would have to be 
repeated in other states in the continent. (35) South African troops had already 
entered Angola, unbeknown at this stage to the South African public; it was hoped I I 
that Latin American diplomatic support would materialize in the event of the issue 
being raised in international fora. Vorster returned home after a stopover in 
U r u g u a y ,  where he was received by President Bordaberry. (36) 
One of the aspirations of South Africa's Latin American strategy was to 
increase ties with the Andean Pact states. Colombia was attempting to industrialize, 
Ecuador and Venezuela were oil producers and might be valuable in helping South Africa 
smash the Arab oil embargo, whilst Chile, Peru and Bolivia were mining economies which 
would have need of South African mining expertise. For reasons of ideological 
proximity, South Africa. chose to focus her initial attention on Chile. At first, the 
Pinochet junta was reticent in its response, fearing it might be further isolated 
internationally as a result of closer ties. Yet this did not deter external 
vilification of her policies, and the junta decided to throw its caution to the wind. 
It offered to denationalize the Ovenstone holdings,appropriated by the Popular Unity 
government, and invited further investment by this South African fishing group. (37) 
South Africa sent a joint IDC/CGIC mission to examine the expansion of export credits 
and considered the possibility of transferring her Mining Counsellor from Buenos 
Aims to Santiago, where a new embassy had been opened during 1975. (38) In March 
1976, Chile reciprocated by opening a consulate-general, despite a flood of 
condemnation from the UN and the OAU, and in August that year government 
representatives received M r  Ernest Blom, an industrialist who was styled as 
llCommercial Ambassador of the Transkei GovernmentI1 and who offered investments and 
the transference of "high level scientists and technicians from the Transkei [sic]11.(39) 
South Africa provided credits to the Chilean mining industry, and in December 1976 
the Chilean Commission for Nuclear Energy reported that two South African enterprises 
had applied for a licence to export uranium to the junta. (40) 
But South Africa had miscalculated Chile's potential as a staginppost for 
expansion into other Andean states: the junta's Friedmanite economic policies created 
a huge rift with the other more protectionist members of the Pact, and in 1976 Chile 
announced her intention to quit the Pact. (41) A second defeat for the Andean 
strategy came when Venezuela announced to the UN General Assembly in November 1976 
that she would discontinue commercial contacts with South Africa. (42) This 1 
represented a loss of an export market worth R60m in 1976, when Venezuela was South 
, 
l 
Africa's biggest customer on the continent. (43) l 
l 
Of the Central American states, some of whom had been visited by the South 
African Minister of Mines, Pieter Koornhof, in 1974 (44), Mexico was by far the most 
important, but she had closed her consulate in Cape Town earlier that year, in 
deference to UN resolutions. (45) 
l 
Brazil at this time began to cease vacillating over whether to support 
black or white Africa. Foreseeing the imminent collapse of the Portuguese empire and 
l 
perceiving her increasing need of Africa's markets and resources, Itamaraty stepped 
up trade relations in West Africa and began to distance herself discreetly from 
Por-hugal. In January 1974 Brazil publicly condemned colonialism for the first time, l 
in a joint declaration signed in Rio by the Foreign Ministers of Brazil and Nigeria, l 
which agreed on the right to self-determination and independence, and which 
repudiated "apartheid, colonialism, and all forms of . . . discrimination". (46) This l 
stand earned oil-hungry Brazil promises of co-operation and association with the 
Nigerian National Oil Company. It also facilitated a more rapid penetration into West 
African economies by Brazilian manufacturing industry, much of which was spearheaded 
by Brazilian subsidiaries of foreign transnational corporations. (47) The policy was 
reinforced by General Ernesto Geisel, who was inauguratedtenda~rs before the Portuguese 
revolution in April 1974. Geisel had formerly headed the state-owned oil corporation, 
Petrobras, and well understood Brazil's need to ensure her enerm supply, without 
which the "Brazilian economic miracle" would certainly disintegrate. Brazills new 
Africa policy, dished up as "pragmatismo responsavel" to placate the substantial pro- 
Portuguese lobby, entailed the rapid recognition of the People's Republics of Guinea- 
Bissau, Mozambique and Angola. (48) In a speech in London Geisells Foreign Minister, 
Antonio Azeredo da Silveira, stated: 
l The African contribution to Brazilian culture has been remarkable ... it is only too natural,therefore, that 1 we should try to develop the warmest and closest 
l relations with the African countries. Of course, a 
I special place in those relations is resemed for -the 
Portuguese-speaking nations whose life as independent 
states is now beginning. Our willingness to co-operate 
with them, on the basis of mutual respect and reciprocal 
advantage, is total as is the frankness and opemess of 
our intentions. (49) 
Brazil1 S intentions soon became clear: "aid" to the oil industry of Angola, to the 
coal industry of Mozambique; "ans~istance'~ in marketing the Angolan coffee crop; 
I credit of $50m to both states. Petrobras was the first foreign concern that Angolan 
I President Neto invited to eqlore for oil in Angola. (50) 
Braeil's exports to Africa rose from $70m in 1971 to $400m in 1977, when 
i South Africa accounted for roughly gD9 of Brazil's African market, despite being her 
largest non-OPM: trading partner on the continent. (51) Brazil now terms her 
l 
, attitude to South Africa as "correct, not cordial", in keeping with which she has 
announced the cancellation of the 1979 Cape-to-Rio yacht race. (52) 
l 
Yet the ttcorrectnessv of the relationship includes an enthusiastic welcome 
for South African private investment. The decision to denationalize certain industxies 
I and mines, taken by Brazil's top technocrats, Finance Minister &io Simonsen and 
Planning Minister JOG Paulo Velloso , provided South African monopoly-S tructured 
1 industry with a useful chance to buy its way inside Latin America's principal national 
economy. (53) The ubiquitous Anglo-American Corporation of Sguth Africa had been 
prescient enough to have set up a Brazilian subsidiary (AMBRAS) during 1973. (54) In 
1975 it was able to purchase a 49% holding in a group of goldmines in Minas Gerais (55), 
40A0 in a company prospecting for gold and other base metals in Bahia (with minority 
holdings held by Bethlehem Steel and the Hanna Mining corporation) (56), 3009 in an 
explosives factory chain (held by the Anglo/1~1 subsidiazy, African Explosives and 
Chemical ~ndustries) (57), 5009 of a construction consortium (the other 5@/0 held by 
l South African monopoly Roberts construction) (58), some shams in a fertilizer 
l factory built by Louis Lyyt's Fertchem International (59), and 4007 in a diamond 
prospecting compmy. (60) Armies of Anglo personnel and tons of south African 
l capital goods entered Brazil, to such an extent that a Brazilian Congressional Commission set up an investigation into these deals, at a time when another Commission 
I was calling on cabinet ministers to give evidence on "foreign penetration in different 
sectors of the economy", including the mining sector. (61) hnt Anglo had once again 
used foresight; its chairman, Harry Oppenheimer, visited Brazil in March 1975 w d  
held discussions with Geisel and other leading technocrats, a mere month before the 
Commission sat. (62) None of Anglots investments were disturbed by the Commission, 
and later in the year another mining house, Gold Fields of South Africa (in which 
Anglo has substantial investments), acquired 34% of an iron mine and a share in a 
prospecting company. (63) 
Shaft Sinkers, another -10 subsidiary, operated. contracts in Bolivia, 
Chile and Peru. (64) In Peru, it was contracted to sink shafts in a copper mine owned 
by a US company, which later granted Anglo certain exploration rights in its mining 
concessions in Peru. (65) General Mining, which Anglo helped capitalize in the early 
1960s, became involved in prospecting for gold and other minerals in Venezuela. (67) 
South Africa's construction monopolies, Roberts Construction and Concor, obtained 
massive contracts: the former helped to build a copper mining construction project 
in Chile (68), the latter formed part of an international consortium to construct the 
R120m Majes Irrigation P m  ject in the Peruvian Andes. (69) The fishing monopolies, 
Ovenstone and Willem Barendz, helped capitalize new fleets in Chile and Argentina, 
respectively. (70) 
Thus, by and large, it is the monopoly sector of private industry which has 
thrust its way into Latin America, with parastatal organizations providing much of the 
state-to-state and export credit financing. 
But what of exports? Had South Africa managed to diversify geographically? 
Between 1966 and 1976, North America and Oceania took the same shares of South Africa's 
total exports (1% and l%, respectively); Europels share dropped from 585 to 555 and 
Africa's dropped from 16% to 1005; the areas which increased their shams were Asia, 
from % to 175, and Latin America from half of 1% to 2%. (71) In relative terms, 
therefore, Asia's share nearly doubled, and Latin Americals increased fivefold, malcing. 
the latter South Africals fastest growing export market, albeit a small one. The 
slicing of the African share of exports meant that the developing countries1 share 
dropped from 18.85 to 15.6% over the ten years. (72) Thus any diversification since 
the last half of the 1960s seems to be of a very small order indeed, and mainly 
occurred amongst the more industrialized, traditional South African markets. In 1974/75 
SAETO reported the steady expansion of the share of total exports to a group of smaller 
industrializing states which it termed the llSecond Eleven" (which include Brazil and 
Argentina) . (73) llThe nature of South Africa! S exports to the Second Eleven in 
comparison with exports to Africa", SAFTO claimed, llsuggests that there is scope for 
considerable expansion of exports of manufactured goods to these countries1'. Indeed, 
their share of total exports had risen from 75 to 795 between 1969 and 1976. (74) It 
seemed important, therefore, in line with this export strategy, that the Brazilian and 
Argentine markets continue to be cultivated. 
The expansion of economic relations with Latin America raises certain 
questions about the nature of the South African state and its ability to act on behalf 
of locally-based capital. Owing to the rapid rate of centralization and concentration 
of capital since the late 1950s, it is no longer easy to define the discrete interests 
of contending llfractions" of capital. Monopolization has led to the situation whereby 
single corporations have acquired interests in various sectors of South African 
industry, and l1nationall1 capital has acquired tramnational interests. Clearly, the 
state has provided avenues for the expansion of the monopolies into Latin America, 
tolerating a degree of direct external investment which is quite substantial. This 
is significant because it comes at a time when there is a severe recession, partly 
attributable to a decrease in the level of foreign investment in and loans for South 
Africa. It is perhaps the fact of the recession itself, and the fall in the domestic 
rate of profit, which has caused the monopolies to seek profits elsewhere, and Latin 
America is one of the few regions where this is possible. (75) The state may perceive 
that this is one way of stimulating a certain amount of domestic production for export, 
thereby serving a twofold purpose: ensuring amelioration of balance of pa~rments 
problems, and maintaining a certain responsiveness to the petit bourgeoisie's demands 
for employment. In addition, by stimulating economic linkages, the state is actively 
organizing capital accumulation with the long-term aim of strengthening the relative 
power and autonomy of the national economy in the world system. The sumrival of South 
African capitalism is dependent upon a sophisticated coercive apparatus, and in this 
regard the linkages with Latin American states have proved useful. 
Military Collaboration 
A persistent theme of South African official propaganda throughout the 1960s 
and 70s has been the emphasis on her strategic significance to the West. In this 
context, South Africa has sought to extend her military role in the South Atlantic and 
Indian Oceans, and by so doing to become an integral part of the i4estern strategic 
defence system. (76) This role was often perceived as a hemispheric one, support for 
which was sought in Australasia as well as Latin America. (77) 
One of the implications of this role was seen as the formation of a South 
Atlantic Treaty Organization, to include Argentina, Brazil and Portugal (also a NATO 
member), aimed at the defence of the South Atlantic, particularly against Soviet naval 
incursion. Co-operation with Portugal in her colonial wars was already occurring at 
this time, and in May 1968 Defence Minister P. W. Botha told Parliament that South 
Africa had taken part in a secret international conference "at service levelf1 with 
friendly southern hemisphere states about joint defence of the sea-routes. (78) 
During 1969, naval units paid courtesy visits to Argentina, and the 
Department of Defence played host to the Commanderin-Chief of the Argentine navy. 
It was decided to exchange naval attach& in order to regularize intermilitary 
contact, and to arrange joint naval exercises. (79) 
Brazil, on the other hand, responded coolly. She had received both the 
South African Foreign Minister and the Portuguese Prime and Foreign Ministers that 
year, and as a result came under heavy attack from the Afro-Asian states. Whilst 
trade expansion was diplomatically feasible, Brazil refrained from military involvement 
and SATO failed to materialize. (8) 
Rumours about the resuscitation of the SATO concept recurred in September 
1976, following the visit of Vice-Admiral Johnson, head of the South African Navy, to 
Buenos Aires during the annual joint manoeuvres of the US and Latin American navies. (81) 
Yet, although Argentine Foreign Minister, Admiral Guzzetti, announced in a televised 
interview that he believed a SATO involving South Africa would be an efficient means 
of guaranteeing the security of the Cape sea-route (82), his Brazilian counterpart, 
Azemdo da Silveira, unambiguously announced that "there is not the slightest 
possibility of a system of collective defence in the South Atlanticff if South Africa 
was to be involved. (83) Johnson was quoted in the Brazilian press as saying: "1 
would like to collaborate with the Brazilians and have them collaborate with us. We 
cannot remain alone. We can't guard this side of the South Atlantic on our own. The 
Brazilian navy is five times as big as South Africa's and it could give us a hand in 
controlling the passage around the Cape. We have excellent relations with the 
Argentine navy - we exchange information and we visit each other peri~dically.~~ (84) 
Whilst Brazil continues to rule out military collaboration with South Africa, the 
SATO concept will remain in abeyance. 
The Chilean navy paid a courtesy visit to South Africa when. its training 
barquentine Esmeralda called at Cape Town in March 1977. (85) The vessel had been 
used immediately after the coup for the internment of sailors loyal to President 
Allende. It has also been claimed, by SWAPO and by Chilean exiles (86), that Chilean 
mercenaries are fighting alongside South African troops against SWAPO forces in 
Namibia. (87) Argentina, too, is concerned to assist the anti-guerrilla operations : 
in 1975 it was reported that she had offered South Africa the Pucar6, an Argentine- 
designed counterinsurgency fighter plane made with French, British, Swiss and Belgian 
components. (88) 
The Potential for White Migration 
Certain Latin American states, keen to benefit from white insecurity in 
southern Africa, are stimulating immigration into underpopulated parts of their 
territories. Prior to his South African visit, General Stroessner said in a press 
interview: lfSouth Africans would be most welcome to settle in Paraguay, especially 
those with a sound knowledge of sugar, citrus and cattle faming.lf (89) In March 1977 
the representative of a Paraguayan investment company visited Rhodesia to publicize 
farming opportunities in his country; in late 1976 Rhodesia had been visited by a 
Urugua;yan lawyer authorized to sell land; a group of 40 Rhodesian tobacco farmers 
visited Argentina to assess the possibilities of resettling there, after it was 
reported that thousands of hectares were being prepared for the settlement of 100 
white Rhodesian families in the province of Salta, 1000 miles north of Buenos Aires.(g~) 
The most significant example of land being offered has come from Bolivia, 
whose Secretary for Immigration, Dr Guido Strauss Ivanovic, announced his intention, 
in March 1977, to "encourage the entry into the country of a large and important 
number (later revealed as 150,000) of white immigrants of German and Dutch origin, 
especially from Namibia, Rhodesia and South Africaw. (91) Financial backing for this 
scheme was sougfht from the West Gemnm government and the UN Intergovermmental 
Committee for European Migcation (ICEM), which is helping to sponsor the Argentine 
scheme. ( 92 )  The Bolivia state, primarily responsive to the 5% of the population 
claiming pure European descent, has throughout this century sought the colonization 
of the fertile eastern part of the country, which lacks the infrastructure for 
development. (93) 
The local response on the part of peasants, workers and the church in 
Bolivia was a vigorous one. A n  international campaign was mounted, backed by the 
church (94), to repudiate the importation of racism into Bolivia. Protests by the 
Bolivian Indigenous Indian Association occurred (95), and the Bolivian Workersf Union 
signed a joint comrnuniqu6 with the Organization of African Trade Union Unity to 
condemn the scheme. (96) 
Yet, in December 1977, Strauss confirmed that the first 50 families were 
due to arrive the following February. (97) The former Bolivian vice-consul in Cape 
Town claimed that he had been contacted by "hundreds of farmers who wished to go to 
Bolivia, all of them Afrikaans-speaking and mainly prosperous well-established 
farmersw. (98) However, the present vice-consul claims that "the number of departures 
for Bolivia has been somewhat exaggerated in the press ... and I do not believe that 
enquiries for emigration are being received from a.ny class other than the farming 
community. There m e  no official statements that I know of by either Government and 
this could well be an indication of the relevant minitude of the matter". (99) These 
remarks indicate an attempt to play down the issue, White emigration is occurring at 
a hi&er rate than ever, and is officially discouraged, so that overt organization of 
such schemes within South Africa may be impolitic. 
Conclusion 
This paper has attempted to trace some of the salient linkages between South 
Africa and Latin America, and to delineate some of the constraints on their development. 
The rationale for increasing the linkages was shown to be based on the need for the 
geographical restructuring of South Africa's export markets at a particular 
conjuncture, and that this process was hastened partly because of Britain's accession 
to the EEC, partly because of the diminution of its African market, and partly because 
of the imperative to find a market for the increased proportion of manufactured goods 
in its total exports. It was the state which created the diplomatic and financial 
"infrastructuren for a significant expansion of direct investment in Latin America on 
the part of South African-based monopolies, represented principally by the mining, 
construction and allied sectors. In Brazil this was facilitated by coincidental, 
domestically planned denationalization decisions; Paraguay, on the other hand, 
constituted a case of Itaid", rating as the Malawi of Latin America. (100) Military 
advantages of these linkages were also manifested, although collaboration on a large 
scale has not occurred, largely owing to Brazil's unwillingness to jeopardize a 
potential sub-imperialis t role for herself in Africa. (101) 
Increasing links will continue to preoccupy those who perceive the 
relationship with some misgiving, owing to the potential for regimes on both sides 
of the South Atlantic to reinforce one another's survival, to the potential for their 
nuclear collaboration, and to potential for the exportation of South African social 
relations into the Gran Chaco. 
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